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Abstract
We examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices
chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry-wide costs are high and that entry
is unproﬁtable. The results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents can credibly deter unproﬁtable
entry without having to distort their prices away from their full information levels. Yet, in a large number of cases, asymmetric
information induces incumbents to raise prices when costs are low. The results also show that the entrants’ behavior is by and
large “bi-polar:” entrants tend to enter when the incumbents’ prices are “low” but tend to stay out when the incumbents’ prices are
“high.”
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1. Introduction
A common feature of signaling games is that senders need to distort their actions away from their full information
levels in order to credibly signal their private information to receivers. In an early application of signaling models to
Industrial Organization, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) used this feature to explain the rationale behind limit pricing
behavior: an incumbent will cut his price before entry occurs in order to signal his own low cost to a potential entrant
and hence deter the latter’s entry into the market. This prediction has received experimental support by Cooper et al.
(1997a, 1997b).
However,manyreal-life applicationsinvolvemorethanoneprivatelyinformedplayer.Forexample,in oligopolistic
markets, privately informed ﬁrms may wish to use their prices or output levels as a way to signal to a potential
entrant that entry is unproﬁtable. Likewise, oligopolistic ﬁrms may wish to use their investments in (uninformative)
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advertising as a way to signal to consumers that the quality of their products is high. This begs the obvious question
of whether results obtained in single-sender games carry over to settings with multiple senders.
Harrington (1987) shows that the answer to this question is “yes.” He studies a Cournot oligopoly limit pricing
model in which two incumbents with the same private information choose their output levels, and based on the re-
sulting price, a potential entrant decides whether or not to enter. Harrington shows that there exists an equilibrium in
which the incumbents deter entry by distorting their output levels downward.1 An important feature in Harrington’s
model is that the entrant observes only an aggregate signal of the incumbents’ choices (the market price), but not their
individual choices (the output level of each incumbent). Bagwell and Ramey (1991) show that this feature is critical:
when the entrant observes the incumbents’ individual prices, the incumbents may be able to credibly deter unprof-
itable entry without having to distort their prices away from their full information levels. Moreover, they show that
this “full information equilibrium” is the only separating equilibrium that survives a belief-based reﬁnement, called
unprejudiced beliefs (UPB), which is based on the minimal number of deviations needed to generate a particular
out-of-equilibrium price combination.2
Bagwell and Ramey’s (1991) results are striking and indicate that there may be a fundamental difference between
multi-sender and single-sender signaling games. Yet, beside the “full information equilibrium,” the oligopoly limit
pricing game that Bagwell and Ramey consider also admits a continuum of separating and pooling equilibria that in-
volve both upward as well as downward price distortions. Given this multiplicity of equilibria, it is natural to wonder
whether multiple senders can nonetheless credibly signal their private information while playing their “full informa-
tion” strategies. And, if they cannot, then which type of behavior emerges when receivers face multiple senders who
share the same piece of private information? Moreover, how do receivers react when they receive conﬂicting signals
from identically informed senders?
To address these questions, we conducted a series of experiments based on a variant of the Bagwell and Ramey
(1991) oligopoly limit pricing model. Subjects were randomly matched in groups of three: two incumbents and one
entrant. The two incumbents privately observed whether the common marginal cost of all three ﬁrms is high or low
and then independently chose their prices. The entrant observed the incumbents’ prices and then had to decide whether
or not to enter. Entry was proﬁtable only when the marginal cost was low. We ran both full information treatments in
which the entrant was informed about the realized marginal cost and asymmetric information treatments in which the
entrant was uniformed about the realized marginal cost and had to infer it from the incumbents’ prices.
The main ﬁndings in our experiments are as follows. First, asymmetric information does not have a signiﬁcant
effect on the subjects’ behavior. In particular, the subjects’ behavior both under full as well as under asymmetric
information is by and large consistent with the full information equilibrium. This means that when information is
asymmetric, incumbents are able to credibly deter entry when cost is high without having to distort their prices away
from the full information prices. These results provide strong support for Bagwell and Ramey’s (1991) theoretical
results and are in stark contrast to earlier experimental results from single-sender signaling games (see Camerer,
2003, Chapter 8).
Second, while Bagwell and Ramey (1991) derive the full information equilibrium by imposing the UPB reﬁne-
ment, we ﬁnd that the entrants’ behavior in our experiments is inconsistent with the UPB reﬁnement. Nonetheless, the
entrants’ behavior is consistent with the main idea behind the UPB reﬁnement which is that small deviations from an
equilibrium should have a small effect on the entrants’ beliefs. In particular, the entrants’ behavior in our experiments
seems to follow a “bi-polar” pattern: entrants tend to enter when the incumbents’ prices are “close” to the full infor-
mation prices when costs are low, but tend to stay out when the incumbents’ prices are “close” to the full information
prices when costs are high. Moreover, entry rates fall (increase) with the Euclidean distance from the full information
1 In Harrington (1987), which extends the monopoly setting of Harrington (1986), the incumbents and the entrant have the same marginal cost
and entry is unproﬁtable when this cost is high. Consequently, the incumbents deter entry by producing a small quantity which signals high marginal
cost to the entrant. This is in contrast with Milgrom and Roberts (1982), where the incumbent’s and the entrant’s costs are uncorrelated; hence, in
their model, low prices, which signal that the incumbent’s marginal cost is low, deter entry. Still, in all three models, prices are distorted away from
their full information levels in order to credibly signal that entry is unproﬁtable.
2 The Bagwell and Ramey model has been extended by Schultz (1999) who studies the case where one incumbent wishes to deter entry while the
other wishes to encourage it and by Martin (1995) who studies the case where the ﬁrms’ costs are imperfectly correlated and the incumbents do not
know each others’ costs. Additional multi-sender signaling games have been studied by Matthews and Fertig (1990), de Bijl (1997), Hertzendorf
and Overgaard (2002), and Fluet and Garella (2002) in the context of advertising, and by Schultz (1996) and Martinelli and Matsui (2002) in the
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prices under low (high) costs and is affected in general by the combination of the incumbents’ prices rather than by
only one of these prices (e.g., the minimal or the maximal price).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design and establishes our
main research questions. The experimental implementation is described in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss
our experimental results. Concluding remarks are in Section 6. Appendix A contains the written instructions that were
given to the subjects.
2. Experimental design and main research questions
Our experiments are based on the Bagwell and Ramey (1991) model of oligopoly limit pricing. There are two
incumbents and one potential entrant. All three ﬁrms have the same marginal cost, which is either low or high with
equal probabilities. The strategic interaction between the three ﬁrms evolves over two periods. At the beginning of
period 1, the two incumbents privately observe whether marginal cost is high (state H) or low (state L), and based
on this information, they simultaneously choose their period-1 prices. The potential entrant observes the incumbents’
period-1 prices, updates his belief about whether marginal cost is high or low, and decides whether or not to enter the
market. If the entrant decides to enter, then all three ﬁrms compete in period 2 by choosing prices. If the entrant stays
out, only the two incumbents compete in period 2. Entry is proﬁtable only when cost is low.
The crucial feature of this game is that there are two senders (the two incumbents) who have the same private
information which they signal to the receiver (the entrant) through their simultaneous price choices. As a result,
the receiver observes two independent signals about the same unknown variable rather than just one signal. One
important implication of this is that in state L, a monopolist incumbent can fool the entrant into believing that entry is
unproﬁtable by mimicking the state H prices. However, when there are two incumbents, both of them need to deviate
in state L in order to mimic the state H—a unilateral deviation from the state L prices is insufﬁcient for generating
the (pair of) state H prices. This feature creates a wide variety of interesting coordination problems that distinguish
our experimental design from previous signaling games with a single sender that have been experimentally tested in
the lab.
Although the Bagwell and Ramey (1991) model, as well as other limit pricing model like Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) and Harrington (1987), has two periods, the interesting signaling interaction occurs only in period 1; period 2
simply involves a straightforward oligopoly game. In order to focus on the equilibrium predictions of the underlying
oligopoly signaling game without needlessly complicating our experimental design, we therefore follow Cooper et al.
(1997a, 1997b) and collapse the original two-period model into a single-period game by adding the period-2 equilib-
rium payoffs to players’ period-1 earnings. Speciﬁcally, the two incumbents were only asked to choose their period-1
prices from the set {30,40,50,60,70,80}, and the entrant was only asked to make an entry decision after observing
the pair of incumbents’ prices. We then computed the resulting Nash equilibrium payoffs in period-2 (either a 3-ﬁrm
oligopoly game in case of entry or a duopoly game in case of absent entry) and added them to the duopoly period-1
proﬁts of the two incumbents. The entrant’s payoff was either equal to his Nash equilibrium payoff in case of entry or
to π in case he decided to stay out.3 The value of π was equal to 10 in some treatments or to 14 in others.
Fig. 1 presents the actual payoff tables that were used in our experiments.4
Fig.1showsthattheincumbentshave 4 relevantpayofftables,dependingonwhetherthemarginalcostislow(State
L) or high (State H) and on whether entry does or does not take place. As mentioned earlier, the two incumbents were
privately informed about the relevant cost state. Hence, in choosing their strategies, the incumbents had to compare
either the two upper tables (in state L) or the two lower tables (in state H). Moreover, notice that the payoff of
each incumbent increases with the price of the rival incumbent, and is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing with the
incumbent’s own price.5 These features may also ﬁt other types of multi-sender signaling games. Hence, although the
3 To make the entrant’s payoff from entry more equal across the two cost states, we assumed that the entrant needs to pay an entry cost of 1 in
state L and 1.5 in state H.
4 The payoff tables are derived from a variant of the Bagwell and Ramey (1991) model. For details, see the Technical Appendix, available at
http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel. In order to make the instructions more “neutral,” the incumbents were asked to choose one of the numbers in the
set {1,2,3,4,5,6}, where 1 corresponds to a price of 30, 2 corresponds to a price of 40, and so on. In addition, incumbents were referred to as
“A-participants,” the entrant as “B-participant,” states H and L as “state 1” and “state 2,” respectively, and the entrants’ decisions were referred to
as “X” (entry) and “Y” (no entry).
5 It is also easy to see from Fig. 1 that the joint payoff of the two incumbents is maximized at (60,60) in state L and at (70,70) in state H.376 W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393
Fig. 1. Payoff tables for the incumbents and the entrant. As usual, the upper left number in each cell of the incumbents’ tables is the row players’
payoff and the lower right number is the column player’s payoff.
payoffs tables were derived from an oligopoly limit pricing game, we believe that our experiments can shed light on a
broad class of multi-sender signaling games, including games in which competing ﬁrms signal their product qualities
to consumers, or electoral competition games in which competing candidates signal some policy relevant state of
nature to voters.
As for the entrant, Fig. 1 shows that following entry, the entrant’s payoff is higher in state L than in state H.A s
mentioned earlier, the entrant’s payoff when staying out, π, was equal either to 10 or to 14, independent of the cost
state.W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 377
2.1. The equilibria in our experimental design
Under full information, the entrant should enter in state L but stay out in state H. Since this decision is independent
of the incumbents’ prices, the two incumbents will simply play the Nash equilibrium prices which are (40,40) in state
L and (60,60) in state H.
Underasymmetricinformation,ourexperimentaldesignadmitsbothseparatingandpoolingequilibria.Weconsider
separating equilibria ﬁrst. In these equilibria, the two incumbents play different prices in state L and in state H.
Consequently, the entrant can infer the state from the incumbent’s prices and hence enters only in state L. Since entry
takes place in state L, two incumbents can do no better than play the full information equilibrium, (40,40).O nt h e
other hand, in state H, at least one incumbent sets a price different than 40 (this is enough to ensure separation). Let
( ˆ pi, ˆ pj) be the incumbents’ prices in state H in a separating equilibrium, where ˆ pi or ˆ pj or both are different than 40.
The equilibrium is supported by the entrant’s belief that any deviation from ( ˆ pi, ˆ pj) is associated with state L; hence
any deviation from ( ˆ pi, ˆ pj) will trigger entry. A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for ( ˆ pi, ˆ pj) to be a separating
equilibrium choice in state H is that πi( ˆ pi, ˆ pj,Out)  πi(BRi( ˆ pj), ˆ pj,In), where πi( ˆ pi, ˆ pj,Out) is the equilibrium
payoff of incumbent i given that in equilibrium the entrant stays out and πi(BRi( ˆ pj), ˆ pj,In) is incumbent i’s payoff
when he deviates from ˆ pi by playing a best response against ˆ pj and given that the deviation triggers entry. In other
words, the necessary and sufﬁcient condition requires that no incumbent can proﬁtably deviate if the deviation triggers
entry.
To illustrate, suppose that the state is H and the incumbents’ prices are (80,80). Given that there is no entry in
equilibrium, the payoff of each incumbent is 26. However, if one incumbent deviates unilaterally to 60 or to 70,
then even if entry is induced, the incumbent’s payoff increases to 28 (if entry is not induced, the incumbent’s payoff
increases to 33). Clearly, then (80,80) cannot be an equilibrium. On the other hand, (70,70) can be chosen in a
separating equilibrium in state H. To see why, suppose that the entrant believes that the state is L unless the two
incumbents play (70,70). If the incumbents indeed play (70,70), then given that the entrant stays out, each incumbent
gets a payoff of 28. However, once the incumbent deviates from 70, entry takes place and the incumbent’s payoff is at
most 25. Hence, when supported by appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs, (70,70) is immune to unilateral deviations
and hence can be chosen in a separating equilibrium. Using this logic, one can verify that in a separating equilibrium,
the incumbents prices in state H must belong to the set {(50,50),(50,60),(50,70),(60,60),(60,70),(70,70)}. It
is worth noting that with the exception of (60,60), prices in this set are not mutual best responses. These prices are
nonetheless played in separating equilibria because they are supported by the entrant’s belief that any deviation from
the equilibrium is associated with state L; hence any deviation will trigger entry.
We now turn to pooling equilibria. In these equilibria, each incumbent plays the same price in states L and H (the
two incumbents though need not choose the same prices). Consequently, after observing the incumbents’ prices, the
entrant maintains his prior belief that the two states are equally likely and therefore expects that his payoff from entry
will be 18×0.5+6×0.5 = 12. Assuming that entrants are not too risk-averse or too risk-lovers, entry will take place
if the entrant’s payoff from staying out, π, is 10 but not when π = 14.6 Since entry takes place when π = 10, the
incumbents might as well play the full-information equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not pooling since the
incumbents’ play (40,40) in state L and (60,60) in state H; hence there are no pooling equilibria when π = 10.
Next suppose that π = 14, so in equilibrium the entrant stays out. Suppose that the incumbents’ prices are ( ˆ pi, ˆ pj)
in both states. Then, similarly to separating equilibria, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a pooling equilibrium
is that πi( ˆ pi, ˆ pj,Out)  πi(BRi( ˆ pj), ˆ pj,In). That is, neither incumbent can increase his payoff by playing a best-
response against his rival’s price when the deviation triggers entry, no matter what the state is. For instance, suppose
that the incumbents’ prices are (70,70). Given that there is no entry in a pooling equilibrium, the payoff of each
incumbent in state L is 60. If an incumbent deviates to 50, his payoff increases to 65 even though the deviation
triggers entry. Clearly then, (70,70) cannot be a pooling equilibrium. On the other hand, (60,60) can be a pooling
equilibrium: if the entrant holds an (out-of-equilibrium) belief that the state is L unless the incumbents’ prices are
(60,60), then any deviation away from (60,60) will trigger entry. Hence a unilateral deviation away from 60 will lead
to a payoff of at most 58 which is below the equilibrium payoff of 63. Using this logic, one can verify when π = 14,
the incumbents’ prices in a pooling equilibrium must belong to the set {(50,50),(50,60),(60,60)} in both states.
6 Clearly, a risk averse entrant may decide to stay out even when π = 10, while a risk-loving entrant may decide to enter even if π = 14.378 W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393
Table 1
Equilibrium price pairs in our experiments
π = 10
P r i c e3 04 05 06 07 08 0
3 0 ––––––
40 L ––––





P r i c e3 04 0 5 0 6 0 7 08 0
3 0 –– – – ––
40 L –– – –
50 P, H P, H H –
60 P, H H–
70 H –
80 –
Note: H—incumbents’ separating prices in state H, L—incumbents’ separating prices in state L, P—incumbents’ pooling prices. The
full information equilibrium is in bold font.
Table 1 summarizes the various equilibrium prices in our experiments. We use “H” to indicate separating equilib-
rium prices in state H, “L” to indicate separating equilibrium prices in state L, and “P” to indicate pooling equilibrium
prices. For instance, when π = 14,( 50,50) is part of both a separating equilibrium in which (50,50) is chosen in state
H and part of a pooling equilibrium in which (50,50) is chosen in both states. Since the incumbents are symmetric,
we only present distinct price pairs (i.e., (50,60) and (60,50) are considered to be the same price pair). Entry takes
place only following the price pair (40,40). Bold face letters indicate the full information equilibrium prices.
Giventhemultiplicityofseparatingequilibria,BagwellandRamey(1991)proposeabelief-basedreﬁnementwhich
they call “Unprejudiced Beliefs” (UPB). The reﬁnement works as follows: suppose that the entrant believes that the
incumbents play (40,40) in state L and ( ˆ p1, ˆ p2) in state H. What should the entrant believe if instead he observes the
price pair ( ˆ p1,p2), where p2  = ˆ p2 and p2  = 40? One possibility is that the state is H and incumbent 2 unilaterally
deviated from ˆ p2. A second possibility is that the state is L and both incumbents deviated from (40,40). Bagwell and
Ramey(1991)arguethattheﬁrstpossibilityismorereasonablebecauseitinvolvesasingledeviationratherthantwoas
in the second possibility. Accordingly, the UPB reﬁnement requires that the entrant will maintain his beliefs following
a unilateral deviation from a putative equilibrium. But then, if a unilateral deviation does not alter the entrant’s beliefs,
the incumbents’ prices must be mutual best responses, otherwise each incumbent can proﬁtably deviate in state H
(the deviation does not trigger entry because it does not alter the entrant’s beliefs that entry is unproﬁtable). This
implies in turn that the UPB reﬁnement eliminates all separating equilibria except the full information equilibrium.
This result is striking because it implies that with two incumbents, all separating equilibria which involve distortions
away from the full information prices can be eliminated.7 For example, (70,70) can no longer be an equilibrium in
state H because at least one incumbent will deviate from 70 to 60. Under the UPB reﬁnement, the deviation will not
alter the entrant’s belief that the state is H and will therefore not trigger entry. As a result, the deviating incumbent
will increase his payoff from 28 to 30. Note that the UPB reﬁnement has no bite in the case of pooling equilibria,
because each incumbent chooses the same prices in both states, so any non-equilibrium price pair is the same number
of deviations away from the price choices in state L and the price choices in state H.
2.2. Research questions
Having fully characterized the equilibria in our experimental design, we are ready to state the main research ques-
tions that we are going to address with our experimental data. The ﬁrst research question concerns the case where
π = 10. As Table 1 shows, in this case we only have separating equilibria. The question that we ask in this case is
whether the subjects in our experiments learn to play one or more of the separating equilibria in Table 1?
The second research question concerns the case where π = 14. As Table 1 shows, here we have both separating
and pooling equilibria. Therefore the question that we ask in this case is whether the subjects learn to play a separating
or a pooling equilibrium, and if so which equilibrium they learn to play?
7 In fact, Yehezkel (2007) shows that the full information equilibrium is the only separating equilibrium that survives the UPB reﬁnement in any
multi-sender signaling game in which the senders know each other’s types.W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 379
Related to the ﬁrst two research questions is our third research question: is the subjects’ behavior under asymmetric
information similar to their behavior under full information, as Bagwell and Ramey predict, or does asymmetric
information affect the subjects’ behavior in a systematic manner?
As we shall see, our experiments provide a strong support for Bagwell and Ramey’s (1991) prediction that the full
information equilibrium emerges even under asymmetric information. Bagwell and Ramey obtain this prediction by
using the UPB reﬁnement. Our fourth research question then is whether the entrants’ behavior is indeed consistent
with the UPB reﬁnement? And, to the extent that its is not, what are the main determinants of the entrants’ behavior?
3. Experimental implementation
We ran 14 sessions of the oligopoly limit-pricing game, using the software tool kit z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
All sessions were held at Tilburg University in September–October 2003 and in May 2005. Each session included
12 different subjects who were randomly recruited students from various departments, mainly from Economics and
Business Administration.
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects were assigned a computer screen and received written instructions in English (see
Appendix A) which they read in private. After reading the instructions, subjects were allowed to ask clarifying ques-
tions (which were answered in private) and were asked to ﬁll in a short questionnaire to ensure that they understand
the instructions. Sessions consisted of 48 rounds. At the beginning of each round, we randomly created four groups
of three subjects: two who played role A (incumbents) and one who played role B (entrant). Following Cooper et al.
(1997a, 1997b), subjects switched roles. In our design, role switching took place every 8 rounds. As a result, each
subject played role A for exactly 32 rounds and role B for exactly 16 rounds.8 The purpose of role switching was to
enhance subjects’ learning and enable them to better understand the decision problem of subjects in the other player
role and therefore the overall game. The random matching was meant to minimize potential repeated game effects
(our experiments are based on a “one shot” oligopoly signaling game that does not feature repeated game effects).9
We implemented 6 different treatments which are summarized in Table 2. The treatments differed with respect to
the information structure (full or asymmetric information), the entrants’ payoff from staying out, π (pooling equilibria
exist only when π = 14), and the experimental method (sequential play or strategy method).
In the four sequential play (SP) treatments, the incumbents were informed about the cost state and were asked to
simultaneouslychooseprices.Then,beforemakingtheirentrydecision,entrantsobservedthepricesoftheincumbents
with whom they were matched, and in the two full information treatments, were also informed about the state. At the
end of each round, subjects were informed about the incumbents’ prices, the entrant’s decision, the realized state, their
own proﬁt in the last round, and their own cumulative proﬁt. The SP sessions lasted about 90 minutes.
In the two strategy method (SM) treatments, incumbents and entrants were simultaneously asked to specify their
complete strategies without observing the cost state: incumbents were asked to specify a price for each of the two
possible states, while entrants were asked to specify an entry decision for each of the possible 21 distinct incumbents’
price pairs. Then the subjects were informed about the realized cost state, the incumbents’ prices for the realized
Table 2









FULL10 2 24 10 unique SPE sequential play
ASYM10 3 36 10 separating equilibria sequential play
FULL14 2 24 14 unique SPE sequential play
ASYM14 3 36 14 pooling & separating equilibria sequential play
ASYM10-SM 2 24 10 separating equilibria strategy method
ASYM14-SM 2 24 14 pooling & separating equilibria strategy method
8 With 48 rounds, we had 6 blocks of 8 rounds. Roles were ﬁxed within each block. The sequence of roles over the 6 blocks were AABAAB for
a third of the subjects, ABAABA for another third, and BAABAA for the last third.
9 On average, the same two incumbents played against each other in 2.9 rounds out of the 32 rounds in which each subject played the role of an
incumbent.380 W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393
state (but not the prices for the other state), the entry decision given the incumbents’ actual prices (but not the entry
decisions for all other 20 possible price pairs), the subjects’ own proﬁt, and their own cumulative proﬁt. To ensure that
subjects have a clear idea of the timing in the original asymmetric information treatments, we started each SM session
with six additional rounds of sequential play as in Treatments ASYM10 and ASYM14.10 Moreover, to facilitate the
entrants’ task and speed up things, the most recent strategy of each entrant was displayed on the entrant’s screen as a
default at the beginning of every round; entrants were then free to change this default.11 The SM sessions lasted about
120 minutes.
Subjects were paid 1 Euro for every 70 points in the SP sessions, and 1 Euro for every 50 points in the longer
and more complicated SM sessions.12 The average earnings in the SM sessions were about 35 Euros compared to 21
Euros in the SP sessions.
4. Results from the sequential play (SP) treatments
In this section we consider the results from the SP treatments. The results from the SM treatments are discussed
in the next section. We will ﬁrst collect a number of facts about subjects’ behavior that will eventually enable us to
answer the ﬁrst three research questions posed in Section 2.2. We begin with the incumbents’ behavior. Fig. 2 provides
information about the incumbents’ price choices. Each row corresponds to a single treatment. The left diagram in each
row shows the evolution of average prices in states L and H, while the middle and right diagrams show histograms of
price choices.13
The histograms in Fig. 2 reveal that incumbents mostly chose the full information prices (40 in state L and 60
in state H) both under full as well as under asymmetric information. These choices were more frequent in rounds
25–48 and were more frequent in treatments with π = 10 than in the corresponding treatments with π = 14. Thus,
the incumbents’ behavior provides strong support for Bagwell and Ramey’s (1991) prediction that the oligopoly limit
pricing model gives rise to a full information equilibrium behavior, especially in treatments with π = 10 which do not
admit pooling equilibria. Moreover, the left diagrams in Fig. 2 show that in all treatments, the incumbents’ average
prices in state H were remarkably close to the full information price of 60 right from the start, whereas in state L,
they exhibited a moderate, but statistically signiﬁcant, downward time trend towards the full information price of
40.14 Together with the fact that the standard deviations of the incumbents’ prices were smaller in rounds 25–48
than in rounds 1–24, this suggests that as sessions have progressed, incumbents gradually “learned” to play the full
information equilibrium.
While Fig. 2 provides strong support for the full information equilibrium, the histograms in this ﬁgure also reveal a
substantial fraction of upward deviations in state L from the full information price of 40 to 50, and, to a lesser extent,
to 60. As Table 1 shows, such price choices in state L are inconsistent with separating equilibrium behavior. The
frequency of the upward deviations in state L was larger in treatments with π = 14 (which admit pooling equilibria)
than in the corresponding treatments with π = 10 (which do not admit pooling equilibria) and was also larger in the
asymmetric information treatments than in the corresponding full information treatments. To examine whether these
cross-treatment differences are signiﬁcant, we estimate the following random effects ordered probit equations:
pist = β ×TREATM +αi +εit,
where pist is incumbent i’s price in round t when the state is s = L,H, TREATM is a treatment dummy, αi is a
ﬁxed subject-speciﬁc component, and εit is a subject-speciﬁc error term that may vary across observations from the
same subject. For example, when testing for the differences between Treatments FULL10 and ASYM10 in state L,
10 More precisely, subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of two “phases” and that they would be informed about the second
phase only after the completion of the ﬁrst phase. To implement role-switching in the ﬁrst phase, each subject played 4 rounds as an incumbent and
2 rounds as an entrant. For more detail, see http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel.
11 A possible drawback of this feature is that the entrants’ may get lazy and fail to update their screens. However, if this is true then asking the
entrants to ﬁll in their entire entry strategies from scratch in every round is equally or even more problematic since the entrants may get lazy and
fail to think hard about their entry strategies.
12 To prevent bankruptcy problems, we gave each subject 100 points at the start of the experiment. It turned out, however, that incumbents got a
negative payoff in only 9 out of 5376 price choices that were made in our experiments.
13 See also the additional data on the session level available at http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/MSY-technicalappendix.pdf.
14 The Pearson correlation between the round numbers and the average prices in state L was signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all treatments.W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 381
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Table 3
p-values of (two tailed) pairwise cross-treatment differences of incumbents’ average price choices (data from all rounds)
State L FULL10 ASYM10 FULL14 State H FULL10 ASYM10 FULL14
ASYM10 0.534 – – ASYM10 0.842 –
FULL14 0.000 0.101 – FULL14 0.716 0.504 –
ASYM14 0.017 0.010 0.708 ASYM14 0.494 0.461 0.385
we included in the regression only price choices made in these treatments in state L and set TREATM equal to 1 if
an observation came from Treatment FULL10 and equal to 0 if it came from Treatment ASYM10.15 The two-tailed
p-values for the null hypothesis that β = 0 are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 has two important implications: ﬁrst, it conﬁrms that there are no signiﬁcant cross-treatment differences
in the incumbents’ prices in state H. Together with Fig. 2, this implies that the incumbents’ prices in state H were
close to the full information equilibrium price 60 across all treatments. By contrast, Fig. 2 and Table 3 imply that
the incumbents’ prices in state L were signiﬁcantly higher in Treatment FULL14 than in Treatment FULL10 and in
Treatment ASYM14 than in Treatment ASYM10. Hence, holding the information structure ﬁxed, an increase in the
entrants’ payoff from staying out, π, induced the incumbents to raise their prices in state L.
Second, Table 3 shows that the incumbents’ prices in Treatments FULL10 and FULL14 were not signiﬁcantly
different than their prices in Treatments ASYM10 and ASYM14, respectively. This implies in turn that holding π
ﬁxed, asymmetric information had no signiﬁcant effect on the incumbents’ behavior relative to the their behavior
under full information. Once again, this provides strong support for the main implication of the Bagwell and Ramey
model of oligopoly limit pricing.
Next, we turn to the entrants’ behavior. Table 4 provides a ﬁrst look at the entrants’ behavior by showing the
average entry rates in the various treatments.
Table 4 shows that entrants tended to enter in state L but stay out in state H. The fact that this is true under
both full and asymmetric information suggests that, by and large, incumbents’ managed to credibly signal the state
to the entrants. On the other hand, the table also shows a large fraction of unproﬁtable entry decisions (entry in
state H and no entry in state L). The frequency of these decisions was smaller in rounds 25–48 than in rounds 1–24,
suggesting that similarly to the incumbents, entrants also “learned” to play the full information equilibrium as sessions
have progressed. Interestingly, unproﬁtable entry decisions occurred not only under asymmetric information, but also
under full information, albeit less often.16 As might be expected, unproﬁtable entry in state H was generally more
common when π = 10, while unproﬁtable no entry in state L was more common when π = 14. Taken together, the
two types of unproﬁtable entry decisions imply that entry rates were higher when π = 10.
So far, we examined the incumbents’ and entrants’ behavior in isolation. In order to answer our ﬁrst three research
questions, we now study their joint behavior. Fig. 3 shows the frequency of price pairs played by the incumbents
in rounds 25–48 and the corresponding entry rates. The top number in each cell shows the overall entry rate at the
relevant price pair (regardless of which state was realized), while the two numbers in parentheses directly below it
represent the frequency with which the relevant price pair was played in state L (left number) and state H (right
number). For instance, in Treatment FULL10, the frequency of (40,40) was 72% in state L, 0% in state H, and the
entry rate following (40,40) was 97%.
A few interesting observations emerge from Fig. 3. First, the incumbents had a strong tendency to play the full
information equilibrium prices, especially when π = 10 and especially in state H: (40,40) was the modal price pair
15 For the estimations we use the “reoprob” procedure written by Frechette (2001) for the software package STATA. Unfortunately, this procedure
cannot be used if a price combination is chosen in one treatment but not in a comparison treatment. We therefore used data from all rounds
(rather than focus only on rounds 25–48) in order to minimize the number of price combinations that were never chosen in any given treatment. In
Treatment ASYM10 however, the price 30 was never chosen in state H and was chosen only once in Treatments FULL10 and FULL14 and only
four times in Treatment ASYM14. Hence, when estimating the random effects ordered probit equations in state H we grouped together the price
choices 30 and 40.
16 Some unproﬁtable no-entry decisions in state L were in fact intentional: several subjects reported in the post-experimental questionnaire that
sometimes they chose to stay out in state L because this choice increased the incumbents’ payoffs by more than it lowered their own payoff. The
post-experimental questionnaire also indicates that some subjects decided to always stay out because this strategy gave them a sufﬁciently high
payoff. Since the payoff from staying out was 14 in treatment FULL14 but only 10 in treatment FULL10, it is not surprising that more entrants
adopted this strategy in treatment FULL14.W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 383
Table 4
Average entry rates in the various treatments
Treatment
FULL10 ASYM10 FULL14 ASYM14
Rounds 1–48
State L 93% 90% 75% 62%
State H 5% 18% 4% 11%
Rounds 25–48
State L 94% 91% 84% 68%
State H 0% 7% 2% 7%
in state L and (60,60) was by far the most commonly played price pair in state H. Moreover, the entry rates were very
high following (40,40) (over 94% in Treatments FULL10,ASYM10, and ASYM10, and 68% in Treatment ASYM14),
but very low following (60,60) (below 7% in all treatments). These observations provide additional support for Bag-
well and Ramey’s (1991) prediction that the oligopoly limit pricing model gives rise to full information equilibrium
behavior.
Second, when the incumbents did not play the full information equilibrium prices, their deviations from these
prices were small: in state L, the second most commonly played price pair was (40,50), with (40,60) being third,
while in state H the second most commonly played price pair was (60,70), with (60,50) being third. In all of these
cases, only one incumbent deviated from the full information price pair. In fact, the only treatment in which both
incumbents deviated consistently from the full information equilibrium prices was Treatment ASYM14, in which the
incumbents played (50,50) and (50,60) in state L about 15% of the time each. In state H by contrast, the incumbents
never consistently played a price pair that involved deviations by both incumbents from (60,60). Interestingly, Table 1
shows that the price pairs (40,50) and (40,60) are out-of-equilibrium prices in state L, while (60,70) and (60,50)
can be played in a separating equilibrium in state H.
Third, the only price choice which is consistent with a pooling equilibrium play is (50,60); its frequency in Treat-
ment ASYM14 was 15% in state L and 12% in state H. While this price choice did not deter entry altogether (as it
should in a pooling equilibrium), the entry rate following (50,60) was merely 34%.
Fourth, Fig. 3 shows that the entry rates were high following “low” price pairs (i.e., those in the upper part of each
table), but low following “high” price pairs (i.e., those in the lower part of each table). We shall explore this pattern in
more detail in the next subsection.
The next three results summarize the discussion so far and provide answers to the ﬁrst three research questions
stated in Section 2.2
Result 1. When the entrant’s payoff from staying out was low (π = 10), the subjects appear to have learned to play
the full-information separating equilibrium.
Result 2. When the entrant’s payoff from staying out was high (π = 14), the subjects tended to play the full-
information separating equilibrium, although in state L there is a substantial fraction of upward deviations from the
full information price of 40. These deviations are inconsistent with either separating or pooling equilibrium choices.
Result 3. (i) Holding the entrant’s payoff from staying out ﬁxed, asymmetric information had no signiﬁcant effect on
the incumbents’ behavior.
(ii) When the entrant’s payoff from staying out was low (π = 10), asymmetric information had no signiﬁcant effect
on the entrants’ behavior.
(iii) When the entrant’s payoff from staying out was high (π = 14), asymmetric information had no signiﬁcant
effect on the entrants’ behavior in state H but discouraged entry in state L.
We end this section with two more comments about the subjects’ behavior in the SP treatments. First, the rel-
atively fast convergence to the full information equilibrium (see Fig. 2) stands in contrast to the typical pattern in
experiments on single-sender signaling games in which the equilibrium play emerges only gradually (Camerer, 2003,
Chapter 8). For example, in the monopoly limit pricing experiments of Cooper et al. (1997a, 1997b), the convergence384 W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393
Fig. 3. The frequencies of various price pairs and the corresponding entry rates. The top number in each cell is the relevant entry rate and the two
numbers in parenthesis directly below it are the frequencies with which the relevant price pair was played in state L (the left number) and in state H
(the right number). There are 192 observations on outcomes in the full information treatments and 288 observations on outcomes in the asymmetric
information treatments.
to equilibrium evolves along the following characteristic adjustment process: initially, incumbents ignore the threat of
entry and choose their myopic maxima. As a result, entrants are able to infer the cost state and hence stay out when
entry is unproﬁtable. Incumbents realize this and then try to deter entry even when entry is proﬁtable. If the game
admits pooling equilibria, play settles into an efﬁcient pooling equilibrium. Otherwise, the pooling attempts are upset
by increased entry rates which induce the incumbents to separate when entry is unproﬁtable. It is plausible that the
incumbents in our experiments also played myopically in early rounds before realizing that they might be able to deter
entry in state L by mimicking the state H prices. But since there are two incumbents, mimicking the state H prices
in state L requires the incumbents to coordinate their actions. Given that coordination is hard to achieve under the
random matching scheme employed in our experiments, incumbents mostly continued to play their full information
strategies throughout.17
17 Answers given in the post-experimental questionnaire indicate that some subjects understood that in state L incumbents have an incentive to
mimic the state H prices but this strategy can succeed only if the two incumbents cooperate. For instance, subject 5 in the second session of
ASYM10writesthatasanincumbent,s/he“[...]triedtochoose 4 [price 60] in which case the B participant [entrant] would be confused about the
state but the other A participant [incumbent] did not cooperate.” (Explanation in italics added.)W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 385
Second, as mentioned earlier, there was a substantial fraction of upward deviations in state L from the full informa-
tion equilibrium price 40, especially in treatments with π = 14. These deviations can be interpreted as attempts by the
incumbents to collude in state L by playing (50,50) or (60,60) instead of playing the Nash equilibrium (40,40).18 At
least under asymmetric information, these collusive attempts may have the additional effect of signaling to the entrant
that the state is H and thereby deter entry.19
5. Results from the strategy method (SM) treatments
The previous section shows that by and large, asymmetric information had no signiﬁcant effect on subjects’ be-
havior. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) derive this result by imposing the UPB reﬁnement which eliminates all separating
equilibria which involve price distortions. The question then is whether the entrants’ behavior in our experiments was
consistent with this reﬁnement, and if not, what were the main determinants of the entrants’ behavior?
To address this question, we conducted the strategy method (SM) treatments, in which the incumbents were asked
to specify a price for each of the two possible states, while the entrants were asked to specify an entry decision for
each of the possible 21 distinct incumbents’ price pairs. These treatments therefore allow us to observe the entire
strategy of the incumbents and the entrants. This feature is particularly useful given that in the SP treatments, we only
have a limited number of observations on the entrants’ responses following price pairs that were not played often (or
not played at all).
Fig. 4 provides a ﬁrst look at the incumbents’ behavior in the SM treatments and shows that it was similar to their
behavior in the SP treatments.
Fig. 4. Incumbents’ behavior in the strategy method (SM) treatments.
18 Answers given in the post-experimental questionnaire indicate that some incumbents were indeed trying to collude, especially in state L.
19 Indeed, as we shall see below, entry rates following the price pairs (50,50) and (60,60) were substantially lower than those following (40,40).386 W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393
Table 5
The relative frequency of strategy choices by incumbents in the strategy-method treatments
ASYM10-SM: Rounds 1–24
pH
30 40 50 60 70 80 Total
pL
3 00000 . 80 0 . 5 1 . 3
40 0 0.8 5.7 47.9 2.1 0 56.5
50 0 0.3 4.9 22.9 1 0.8 29.9
60 0 0.3 0.5 6.8 1.8 0 8.3
70 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 1.6
80 0 0 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.8 2.3
Total 0 1.3 12 79.7 4.9 2.1 100
ASYM10-SM: Rounds 24–48
pH
30 40 50 60 70 80 Total
pL
30 0.5 0 0 0.3 0 0 0.8
40 0 0.5 1.8 60.7 3.4 0 66.4
50 0 0.3 2.3 21.9 0.3 0.3 25
60 0 0.5 0.5 3.6 0.3 0 4.9
70 0 0.3 0.3 0 1.6 0.3 2.3
80 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
Total 0.5 1.6 4.9 86.5 5.6 1.1 100
ASYM14-SM: Rounds 1–24
pH
30 40 50 60 70 80 Total
pL
30 0.5 0 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 2.3
40 0 0 0.5 52.3 2.9 0.3 56
50 0 0 0.5 21.1 1.3 0 22.9
60 0 0 1 10.7 4.9 0 16.7
70 0 0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0 1
8 0 0000 . 50 0 . 51
Total 0.5 0 2.9 85.7 9.9 1 100
ASYM14-SM: Rounds 25–48
pH
30 40 50 60 70 80 Total
pL
30 0 0 0.3 0.5 0 0 0.8
40 0 0 0 62.5 0.3 0.3 63
50 0 0 0.3 18.5 1 0.3 20.1
60 0 0 1.3 9.1 4.7 0 15.1
70 0 0 0.3 0 0.5 0 0.8
80 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0.3
Total 0 0 2.1 90.9 6.5 0.5 100
Note: Each table summarizes a total of 384 incumbent strategy choices.
Table 5 provides a closer look at the incumbents’ behavior by presenting the frequencies of the incumbents’ strate-
gies in each half of the SM treatments (the entries in each matrix sum up to 100).20 For instance, in rounds 1–24 of
Treatment ASYM10-SM, the full information strategy “40 in state L and 60 in stage H” was chosen in 47.9% of the
cases.
Table 5 shows that the incumbents’ modal strategy choice in the SM treatments is the full information strategy
(40 in state L and 60 in state H), and its frequency was larger in rounds 25–48 than in rounds 1–24. This suggests
that as sessions progressed, the incumbents learned to play the full information strategies, with over 60% of the
incumbents playing this strategy in rounds 25–48. The second most common strategy was 50 in state L and 60
in state H. The frequency of this strategy varied from 18.5% in Treatment ASYM14-SM to 22.9% in Treatment
ASYM10-SM. Interestingly, this strategy is not an equilibrium strategy. The only other frequently played strategy
was the pooling equilibrium strategy in which subjects played 60 in both states. Not surprisingly, this strategy was
played more frequently in Treatment ASYM14-SM (which admits pooling equilibria) than in Treatment ASYM10-
SM (which does not admit pooling equilibria).
Next we turn to the entrants’ behavior. Table 6 presents the entry rates associated with each distinct price pair in
rounds 25–48 of Treatments ASYM10-SMandASYM14-SM (we will discuss the reason for writing some entry rates
in bold font shortly).21 The table shows that by and large, entrants chose to enter when the incumbents’ prices were
(40,40), but chose to stay out when the incumbents’ prices were (60,60).
We now ask whether the entrants’ response to other price pairs is consistent with the UPB reﬁnement. To this
end, recall that the UPB reﬁnement implies that unilateral deviations from (40,40) in state L and (60,60) in state H
20 Notice that Table 5 differs from Fig. 3 in that it presents the incumbents’ strategies (the prices that each incumbent chose for the two possible
states), while Fig. 3 shows the price pairs that two incumbents played at a given state (in the SP treatments the incumbents speciﬁed their choices
only for the state that was realized but not for the other state).
21 We excluded from the data 11 subjects who did not respond to the incumbent’s prices: 2 of these subjects always entered (both participated
in session 2 of treatment ASYM10-SM) while 9 always stayed out (one participated in session 2 of treatment ASYM10-SM, three participated
in session 1 of treatment AYM14-SM, and additional ﬁve participated in session 2 of treatment AYM14-SM). Including these 11 subjects in the
analysis would have only added noise and made it harder to understand the behavior of entrants who did respond to the incumbents’ prices.W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 387
Table 6
Average entry rates in rounds 25–48 of treatments ASYM10-SM and ASYM14-SM (some data excluded)
ASYM10-SM: Session 1
P r i c e3 04 05 06 07 0 8 0
30 85 85 85 85 85 77
40 – 94 94 85 69 60
50 – – 77 34 10 27
60 – – – 11 12 10
70 – – – – 19 19
8 0 ––––– 1 0
ASYM10-SM: Session 2
P r i c e3 04 05 06 07 0 8 0
30 65 65 56 67 56 67
40 – 50 71 68 56 60
50 – – 50 46 32 35
60 – – – 26 40 39
7 0 –––– 1 9 3 2
8 0 ––––– 3 3
ASYM14-SM: Session 1
P r i c e3 04 05 06 07 0 8 0
30 89 89 75 44 56 65
40 – 99 86 65 56 67
50 – – 44 43 22 22
60 – – – 0 11 21
70 – – – – 11 22
8 0 ––––– 33
ASYM14-SM: Session 2
P r i c e3 04 05 06 07 0 8 0
30 96 86 88 84 79 82
40 – 91 82 82 71 77
50 – – 46 29 29 34
60 – – – 12 11 20
7 0 –––– 1 8 1 8
8 0 ––––– 1 8
should not affect the entrant’s beliefs and hence his entry decision. Consequently, the entry rates following the price
pairs (x,40) and (x,60), where x ∈{ 30,50,70,80}, should be the same as those following (40,40) and (60,60),
respectively.22 (Thereﬁnementdoesnotpindowntheentrant’sbelieffollowing (40,60) sincethispairisonedeviation











= F(γ60D60,60 +vi +εit),
where Entryit(p1,p2) is the entry decision of subject i in round t at a given price pair (p1,p2), D40,40 and D60,60,
respectively, are dummy variables which are equal to 1 if the entry decision was made following the price pair (40,40)
and (60,60) and are equal to 0 otherwise, νi is a ﬁxed subject-speciﬁc component, and εit is a subject-speciﬁc error
term that may vary across observations from the same subject. For example, to test whether the entry rates following
the price pairs (40,40) and (x,40) are signiﬁcantly different, we included in the regression only the entry rates
following these two price pairs. Hence, the variables γ40 and γ60 measure the effect that unilateral deviations from
(40,40) and (60,60) had on the entry rates. In each regression, we only used data from rounds 25–48 (in which the
subjects are already experienced) and excluded subjects who did not react to the incumbents’ prices.
The results (which we do not report in detail) show that with few exceptions, the entry rates in Table 6 following
(x,40) and (x,60), where x ∈{ 30,50,70,80}, are signiﬁcantly different than those following (40,40) and (60,60),
respectively.23 This implies that the entrants’ behavior was inconsistent with the UPB reﬁnement: by and large, uni-
lateral deviations from (40,40) discouraged entry, while unilateral deviations from (60,60) encouraged entry.
While the entrants’ behavior was inconsistent with the UPB reﬁnement, the entry rates in Table 6 suggest that
entrants’ behavior was nonetheless consistent with the general idea behind the UPB reﬁnement, in the sense that
“small” deviations from equilibrium had a “small” effect on the entrants’ behavior. In particular, the entrants tended
to enter following price pairs that were “close” to (40,40) but tended to stay out following prices that were close to
(60,60).
To examinethis“bi-polar” patternin more detail,we perform a hierarchicalagglomerativeclusteranalysisofthe 21
average entry rates in each of the four SM sessions. In general, a hierarchical cluster analysis is a statistical method for
22 It should be noted however that since there were unproﬁtable entry decisions even under full information (failure to enter in state L and entry
in state H), the correspondence between the entrants’ behavior and their beliefs is only imperfect.
23 We were unable to check for the signiﬁcance of unilateral deviations from (60,60) in session 1 of treatment ASYM14-SM, using probit
regressions because there was no entry at all following (60,60).388 W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393
identifying relatively homogeneous clusters of observations based on their characteristics. An agglomerative analysis
starts with each observation as a separate cluster and then merges the two closest clusters into a single cluster. This
process is repeated sequentially, thereby reducing the number of clusters at each step until only one cluster is left. To
determine the distance between every two possible clusters, we use Ward’s method in which the successive clustering
steps are chosen to minimize at each step the variance within clusters (see Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990).24 In
general, Ward’s method is regarded as very efﬁcient, but tends to create clusters of small size.
The cluster analysis reveals that each of the four SM sessions featured two very distinct clusters: one cluster with
“high” entry rates which are marked in Table 6 by bold font (cluster HIGH) and a second cluster with “low” entry
rates (cluster LOW). This “bi-polar” entry behavior was more pronounced in Treatment ASYM10-SM which does not
admit pooling equilibria. Mann-Whitney U tests reveal that the difference between the average entry rates across the
two clusters is highly signiﬁcant (p<0.001) in all four sessions. It should also be noted that price pairs in which the
minimal price was either 30 or 40 were always part of cluster HIGH, while, apart from (80,80), price pairs in which
both prices were at least 50 and their sum was at least 120 were always part of cluster LOW.
Having identiﬁed two clusters in the entrants’ data, we now analyze the entrants’ behavior within each cluster. To








(p1 −40)2 +(p2 −40)2 and DIS60 ≡

(p1 −60)2 +(p2 −60)2 are the Euclidean distances of
(p1,p2) from (40,40) and (60,60); Min ≡ min{p1,p2} and Max ≡ max{p1,p2} are the minimal and maximal com-
ponents of (p1,p2); CLUSTER is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if (p1,p2) belongs to cluster HIGH (i.e.,
the bold-faced entry rates in Table 6), and is equal to 0 if (p1,p2) belongs to cluster LOW; and Entryit(p1,p2) and
εit are deﬁned as above. As before, we restrict attention to rounds 25–48 and exclude from the data subjects who
did not respond to the incumbent’s prices. The regression results are shown in Tables 7 and 8. Regression 2 in each
table includes the CLUSTER dummy while regression 1 does not include it. The coefﬁcients in the tables are the
marginal effects of the relevant explanatory variables on the probability of entry, evaluated at the mean of the re-
spective explanatory variable. In other words, each coefﬁcient in Tables 7 and 8 represents the partial derivative of
Prob[Entryit(p1,p2)] with respect to the relevant explanatory variable, when the derivative is evaluated at the mean
value of the variable. The marginal effect of the dummy variable CLUSTER is the change in Prob[Entryit(p1,p2)]
due to a switch from cluster LOW to cluster HIGH.
Table 7
Results of entry rates regressions for treatment ASYM14-SM (marginal effects)
Asym10-SM, session 1 Asym10-SM session 2
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2
α1(DIS40) −0.0383*** −0.0228*** −0.0053 0.0003
(0.0047)( 0.0048)( 0.0040)( 0.0042)
α2(DIS60) 0.0259*** 0.0132*** 0.0050** 0.0024
(0.0028)( 0.0030)( 0.0025)( 0.0026)
α3(Min) −0.0003 0.0033 −0.0086*** −0.0056**
(0.0024)( 0.0024)( 0.0023)( 0.0024)
α3(Max) 0.0186*** 0.0098*** 0.0033 0.0004
(0.0035)( 0.0035)( 0.0032)( 0.0033)
α5(CLUSTER) −0.4639*** −0.2240***
(0.0484)( 0.0580)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
24 More precisely, the distance between every two clusters, X and Y,i sg i v e nb yD(X,Y) = ESS(XY) − ESS(X) − ESS(Y), where XY is the






where |·|is Euclidean distance between observation zi and the mean observation in cluster Z.W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 389
Table 8
Results of entry rates regressions for treatment ASYM14-SM (marginal effects)
Asym14-SM, session 1 Asym14-SM session 2
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 1 Regression 2
α1(DIS40) −0.0646*** −0.0522*** −0.0162*** −0.0097*
(0.0069)( 0.0067)( 0.0055)( 0.0056)
α2(DIS60) 0.0564*** 0.0546*** 0.0218*** 0.0130***
(0.0048)( 0.0045)( 0.0032)( 0.0036)
α3(Min) 0.0189*** 0.0284*** −0.0089*** −0.0038
(0.0034)( 0.0036)( 0.0028)( 0.0030)
α3(Max) 0.0358*** 0.0301*** 0.0069 0.0023
(0.0050)( 0.0050)( 0.0045)( 0.0045)
α5(CLUSTER) −0.5754*** −0.3455***
(0.0636)( 0.0704)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1,
*** p<0.01.
Tables 7 and 8 indicate that the entrants’ behavior in the strategy method (SM) treatments exhibits a “bi-polar”
pattern: relatively high entry rates following “low” incumbent price and relatively low entry rates following “high”
incumbent prices. In particular, the coefﬁcient of the CLUSTER dummy is highly signiﬁcant even after controlling
for other possible determinants of entry rates. The tables show that a switch from cluster LOW to cluster HIGH
leads to a large drop in the probability of entry which ranges from 22.4 percentage points in session 2 of Treatment
ASYM10-SM, to 57.5 percentage points in session 1 of Treatment ASYM14-SM.
Moreover, the tables show that with the exception of session 2 in Treatment ASYM10-SM, entry rates increased
with the Euclidean distance from the price pair (60,60) but decreased with the Euclidean distance from the price
pair (40,40), and were also affected by the minimum and the maximum price chosen by the incumbents. It should
be noted that in general, the entrants’ behavior was affected by the combination of incumbents’ prices rather than by
only one of these prices (say the minimum or the maximum price). The fact that both prices matter means that there
is an important difference between single sender signaling games in which the receiver observes a single signal and
multi-sender signaling games in which the receiver observes more than one signal about the same unknown parameter.
We summarize the main ﬁndings on the entrants’ behavior as follows:
Result 4. The entrants’ behavior is inconsistent with the formal deﬁnition of UPB reﬁnement, but is nonetheless
consistent with the general idea behind the UPB reﬁnement, which is that “small” deviations from equilibrium prices
should have “small” effects on the receivers’ (entrants’) behavior. In particular, it appears that the entrants followed
a “bi-polar” decision rule and tended to enter following “low” price pairs but tend to stay out following “high” price
pairs.
Finally, given that the entrants’ behavior is inconsistent with the UPB reﬁnement, one may wonder how come we
nonetheless get such strong support for the full information equilibrium? To examine this issue, we have computed
the incumbents’ empirical expected payoffs for each of the four SM sessions, given the actual average entry rates in
rounds 25–48 of that session. For instance, recalling that the payoff of each incumbent in state L following (30,30)
is 42 if there is entry and 53 is there is no entry, and noting that the average entry rate in rounds 25–48 of session 1 of
ASYM10-SMfollowing(30,30) was 85%, the expected payoff of each incumbent in state L of that session following
(30,30) was 0.85×42+0.15×53 = 43.6. The incumbents’ empirical expected payoffs in session 1 of ASYM10-SM
are presented in Table 9.
Using these payoff matrices, it is easy to check that the unique Nash equilibrium in the reduced-form game between
the two incumbents is (40,40) in state L and (60,60) in state H. Similar computations shows that the unique Nash
equilibrium in the incumbents’ reduced game coincides with the full-information equilibrium in all SM sessions. This
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Table 9
Incumbents’ expected payoff matrices given entrants’ actual behavior in rounds 25–48 in session 1 of treatment ASYM10-SM
ASYM10-SM, Session 1, state L
P r i c e 3 04 05 06 07 0 8 0
30 43.6 46.7 49.8 53.7 56.7 60.8
40 44.8 48.7 53.7 59.8 66.7 72.8
50 39.8 45.7 52.5 65.9 74.9 80.0
60 28.7 36.7 50.9 61.8 69.7 78.8
70 19.8 21.7 38.8 48.6 57.7 67.7
80 20.8 22.8 26.8 28.8 38.9 51.9
ASYM10-SM, Session 1, state H
P r i c e 3 04 05 06 07 08 0
30 −2.4 −3.4 −5.3 −7.3 −8.4 −9.9
40 8.88 .38 .38 .89 .61 0 .0
50 13.81 5 .31 7 .22 1 .32 4 .52 4 .7
60 11.81 5 .82 1 .32 5 .52 9 .43 2 .5
70 8.89 .61 7 .52 2 .42 7 .13 2 .1
80 9.21 0 .01 1 .71 2 .51 9 .12 5 .5
Note: Only the row player’s payoffs are shown.
6. Conclusion
We have examined the strategic behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing exper-
iments in which two incumbents are privately informed about whether entry is proﬁtable or not. Using the intuition
from monopoly limit pricing games, one might expect that the incumbents would have to distort their prices away
from their full information levels in order to credibly signal that entry is unproﬁtable. However, as Bagwell and
Ramey (1991) ﬁrst showed, this need not be the case when the entrant can observe the prices of both incumbents. In-
tuitively, starting from the full information prices, incumbents might wish to fool the entrant when entry is proﬁtable
into believing that it is unproﬁtable. However, this requires both incumbents to mimic the prices that would have been
chosen had entry been unproﬁtable. But since the incumbents cannot coordinate their prices, the entrant will not be
fooled and hence entry will take place only when it is proﬁtable. As a result, the incumbents will simply play their full
information strategies.
While the full information equilibrium is very appealing and while Bagwell and Ramey (1991) prove that it is
the only separating equilibrium that survives when the entrants’ beliefs are unprejudiced, the oligopoly limit pric-
ing model also admits additional equilibria which involve price distortions. The question then is whether the full
information equilibrium emerges and whether unproﬁtable entry is credibly deterred without price distortions by the
incumbents. The latter question is important because separating equilibria which involve upward price distortions are
anticompetitive in the short run and may fail to lead to actual entry in the long run. It is therefore natural to wonder if
these anticompetitive equilibria emerge or not.
Our experimental results provide strong support for the full information equilibrium: incumbents’ prices quickly
converge to the full information equilibrium levels both under full and under asymmetric information and entrants
learn to correctly interpret the incumbents’ prices and (tend to) enter when it is proﬁtable to do so but stay out
otherwise. This behavior is particularly pronounced in treatments that do not admit pooling equilibria. Our results
also show that the entrants seem to follow a “bi-polar” decision rule and tend to enter following “low” price pairs but
tend to stay out following “high” price pairs. Moreover, their entry rates fall (increase) as prices get further away from
the full information prices when entry is proﬁtable (unproﬁtable).
Our results leave several interesting questions about multi sender games unanswered. First, in our experiments
the incumbents’ interests were perfectly aligned as both incumbents were interested in deterring entry. However, one
can think about real-life situations in which multiple informed players may wish to signal conﬂicting messages to
the same uninformed player. For example, if the entrant’s product is a substitute for the product of one incumbent
but a complement for the product of the other incumbent, then the ﬁrst incumbent will be interested in deterring
entry while the second incumbent will be interested in promoting it (see Schultz, 1999).25 The question then is what
kind of equilibrium emerges when the senders “compete” with each other on the receiver’s beliefs. In particular, out
of equilibrium actions by the senders may have a new meaning in this context because the receiver may interpret a
deviation from a putative equilibrium as an attempt to discredit the signal sent by the rival sender.
25 Other scenarios in which the incumbents will have conﬂicting interests include the case where one incumbent operates in the upstream market
while the other operates in the downstream market and the entrant considers entry into one of these markets, and the case where each incumbent
operates in a separate market and wishes to deter entry into his own market (but does not care if there is entry into the other market). Note that in
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Second, the two incumbents in our experiments shared the same information. This setting is a natural starting point
for experimental studies of oligopoly limit pricing games because it differs from the monopoly limit price game only
in the number of senders but not in the information structure. However, in some applications, (e.g., Martin, 1995), the
senders’ information may only be imperfectly correlated. If the incumbents’ costs are imperfectly correlated, then in
a separating equilibrium, any price combination may emerge with positive probability on the equilibrium path. This
suggests in turn that a price distortion would be needed to support a separating equilibrium.26
Third, a crucial feature of our experimental setting is that the entrant can observe the individual price of each
incumbent. Without this feature, the incumbents would not face a coordination of the kind we explored in our exper-
iments. The obvious question is whether absent this coordination problem, e.g., when the entrant observes a signal
only about the aggregate behavior of the incumbents as in Harrington (1987), the oligopoly limit pricing game would
involve price distortions or not.
In light of these open questions, we view our results as a ﬁrst attempt to examine the behavior of individuals in the
context of multi-sender signaling games. We believe that further experimental studies are needed in order to enhance
our understanding of how individuals behave in such situations.
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Appendix A. Instructions (treatment FULL10/ASYM10)
Please read these instructions closely!
Please do not talk to your neighbors and remain quiet during the entire experiment.
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you to answer it.
A.1. Introduction
In this experiment you can earn money by interacting with other participants.
Your earnings will be measured in “Points.” The number of points that you will earn will depend on the decisions
that you and the other participants make.
At the beginning of the experiment, every participant will receive 100 Points as an initial endowment.
Your total number of points at the end of the experiment will be equal to the sum of the points you have earned in
each round plus your initial endowment.
For every 70 Points you will be paid 1 Euro in cash.
Your identity will remain anonymous to us as well as to the other participants.
A.2. Description of the experiment
The experiment will consist of 48 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be ﬁrst randomly assigned into one of 4 groups of 3 participants each. In
each group, two participants will be assigned to act in role A and one participant will be assigned to act in role B.
After the 4 groups were formed, a random draw for each group will determine the “state”: with probability 1
2,t h e
state will be “state 1” and with probability 1
2 it will be “state 2.”
26 Martin (1995) shows that if the incumbents do not know each other’s costs, then apart from entry deterrence effects there are also cost-type
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The realized state (state 1 or state 2) will be announced to the two A-participants in each group. Then, each A-
participant will be asked to choose one of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.
[The next sentence only in Treatment ASYM10] After the two A-participants have chosen their numbers, the B-
participant will be informed about the two numbers chosen by the two A-participants in his/her group, but not about
which state was realized.
[The next sentence only in Treatment FULL10] After the two A-participants have chosen their numbers, the B-
participant will be informed both about the state (whether it is state 1 or state 2) and about the two numbers chosen
by the two A-participants in his/her group.
Then, the B-participant will have to choose between option “X” and option “Y.”
The payoff in each round is described below.
A.3. Payoffs
The payoff of each A-participant in each round will depend on the state, on the numbers chosen by the two A-
participants, and on the option chosen by the B-participant.
The payoff of each B-participant in each round will depend on his/her own decision and on the state, but not on the
numbers chosen by the two A-participants in his/her group.
All necessary information about the precise payoffs is included in the 5 tables that appear at the end of these
instructions. [See Fig. 2.]
All A-participants have the same payoff tables, and all B-participants have the same payoff tables.
A.4. The payoffs of the A-participants
The 4 tables that specify the payoffs of the A-participants result from the realized state and the decision of the
B-participant with whom the two A participants are grouped in the relevant round.
Each of the 4 tables corresponds to one possible combination of the realized state and the option chosen by the B-
participant.One table corresponds to the case where the realized state is 1 and participant B chose option X, the second
table corresponds to the case where the realized state is 1 and participant B chose option Y, the third table corresponds
to the case where the realized state is 2 and participant B chose option X, and the fourth table corresponds to the case
where the realized state is 2 and participant B chose option Y.
The rows in the A-participants’ payoff tables correspond to the participant’s own chosen number (each row corre-
sponds to one of the 6 possible choices that the participant can make) and the columns correspond to the choice made
by the other A-participant (each column corresponds to one of the 6 possible choices that the other A-participant can
make). The upper left number in each cell (in blue) corresponds to the participants’ own payoff and the bottom right
number in each cell (in red) corresponds to the other A-participant’s payoff.
Note that since the B-participant in each group chooses between options X and Y after the two A-participants in
their group have chosen their numbers, the A-participants will not know, when making their choice, which payoff
table is relevant for them. (Given the announced state there could be two relevant payoff tables depending on the
B-participant’s choice.)
A.5. The payoffs of the B-participants
The rows in participant B’s payoff table correspond to the option that the B-participant chooses (X or Y) and the
columns correspond to the realized states (state 1 or state 2). Therefore, each of the 4 cells speciﬁes the B-participant’s
payoff for a speciﬁc combination of the B-participant’s own choice and the realized state.
A.6. Role assignment and information during the experiment
The experiment will consist of 48 rounds.
Your role in the experiment will alternate between role A and role B. The roles are ﬁxed for 8 consecutive rounds.
After 8 rounds, new roles are assigned to all participants and these roles remain ﬁxed for another 8 rounds.
Each participant will act exactly 32 rounds in role A and exactly 16 rounds in role B.W. Müller et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 373–393 393
Your computer screen (see the top line) indicates in every round which role you have in that round.
Please remember that in every round, 4 groups of 3 participants are randomly selected from the pool of all partic-
ipants in the room. We will make sure that each of the 4 groups will always consist of two A-participants and one
B-participant.
At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in your own group
during the round: what was the realized state, what were the numbers chosen by the two A-participants, what was the
option chosen by the B-participant, and what was your own payoff.
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